
















Using administrative data records from the Spanish Employment Agency we examine 
whether or not there is evidence of state dependence in unemployment under benefits in 
Spanish young workers. For this fact, we use a mixed proportional hazard model that 
allows for state dependence through lagged duration dependence in order to disentangle 
the effects of unobserved individual heterogeneity  and the true state dependence. We 
have found evidence that past unemployment experience and unobserved individual 
components affect the experience of longer future unemployment spells under benefits. 
However, we appreciate in workers with completed past unemployment spells that the 
correlation between the duration of succesive unemployment spells is only due to the 
unobserved components across individuals. Besides, we observe that workers in their 
second unemployment experience under benefits present higher hazard rates that in their 
first unemployment experience under benefits. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
Since James Heckman and  George Borjas first raised the question in 1980, does 
unemployment cause future unemployment? A few authors become to study this issue 
which yet nowadays comes to no absolutely firm conclusions about the existence of 
state dependence. In the economic literature, two types of state dependence have been 
offered to interpret this phenomenon: the spurious and the true state dependence. The 
spurious state dependence argues that individuals differ in unobserved characteristics 
that influence their probability of  experiencing unemployment but that are not infuenced 
by the experience of unemployment. Under the true state dependence, the prior 
unemployment experience has a genuine behavioral effect in the sense that an identical 
individual who did not experience unemployment would behave differently in the future 
than an individual who experienced unemployment. Thus workers with longer periods 
of unemployment reduce their future employability because they lose work experience 
or human capital while are unemployed, or  because potential employers infer the 
unobserved components of the workers quality from their history of employment and 
unemployment (Vishwanath (1989), Lockwood (1991), Omori (1996)). Alternativility, 
workers may decrease their reservation wage while are  unemployed, and accept bad 
jobs that are more likely to be destroyed, and increase the probability to experiment 
future unemployment spells. 
There are not many studies that have studied the state dependence and even provide 
inconclusive evidence over their causes. On the one hand, there are works that do not 
find evidence that past unemployment causes future unemployment and the correlation 
between the duration of successive unemployment reflects heterogeneity across 
individuals. A given individual enjoys t he same chance of reemployment no matter how 
long or short these periods of past unemployment have been. For example, Heckman 
and Borjas (1980) with US data from the National Longitudinal survey (NLS) 1969-
1971 for 122 young men graduated from high school  in 1969, include measures of past 
nonemployment as regressors in a model of observed nonemployment spell and do not 
find evidence that past unemployment cause future unemployment. Lynch (1985) uses a 
sample from a longitudinal survey of young people living in London who were 
unemployed one year (April 1980) after leaving school, includes measures of past 
unemployment as covariates in a reemployment hazard model of observe 
unemployment and does not find evidence of true state dependence. On the another   3
hand, Lynch (1989) and Trivedi and Alexander (1989) affirm that there is true state 
dependence. Lynch (1989) using a similar approach that in her previous paper with a 
cohort of youths not employed of the NLS, reports no or negative effects of past 
nonemployment in the reemployment probability, depending on the assumption about 
the distribution of nonemployment spells. Trivedi and Alexander (1989) with a Cox's 
partial likelihood approach and a sample of 2.402 individuals obtained from the 
Australian National Longitudinal Survey (ANLS), support the hypothesis that the 
duration of previous unemployment is an important determinant of reemployment 
probability. Finally, authors as Omori (1997) suggests that both types of state 
dependence exist. The true and the spurious state dependence. He estimates a 
semiparametric maximum likelihood estimator controlling the observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity for a cohort of 2.184 young men taken from the NLS and finds that the 
unobserved heterogeneity and the past experience in  nonemployment influence in the 
duration of future nonemployment spells
1.  
There are some reasons why theses studies may fail to identify the importance of the 
unobserved heterogeneity components and the past experience in unemployment to 
explain the duration of the future unemployment spells. First, the hazard models can 
incorporate time varying covariates and Lynch (1985,1989) does not incorporate them 
into the hazard models. Second, Trivedi and Alexander (1989) do not control for the 
effect of the unobserved heterogeneity characteristics and only focus on the study of the 
work history. Third, to assume a parametric distribution on the nonemployment duration 
may affect the maximum likelihood estimates. Thus, Lynch (1989) reports not or 
negative effect of the past unemployment when assumes a log logistic and weibull 
distribution, respectively. Fourth, Heckman and Borjas (1980) use a small sample that 
make them difficult to detect the effect of the past nonemployment duration on the 
reemployment hazard. Fifth, Lynch (1985,1989) includes the current unemployment 
duration in the hazard model and may provoke inconsistent maximum estimations 
because there is a correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity component and the 
past unemployment duration. Finally, neither of the authors mentioned above do not 
estimate simultaneously the hazard model for the past and present unemployment spells 
that is essential to control the possible spurious state dependence between 
unemployment spells. 
                                                                 
1 Omori(1996) developed a method for distinguishing between the effects of stigma and human capital 
decay as a true state dependence explanation.   4
The objective of the current study is to participate in the discussion
2 about the causes 
of the unemployment state dependence. In particular, we shall investigate whether or 
not there is evidence of state dependence for the Spanish youth unemployed that 
perceive benefits.  In our empirical analysis we utilize a longitudinal database that comes 
from administrative records contained in the Historical Integrated Benefits System 
(HSIPRE, Histórico del Sistema Integrado de Prestaciones) collected by the Spanish 
Employment Agency (INEM, Instituto Nacional de Empleo).  The richer nature of the 
data set used, both in terms of sample size and information available on each individual, 
allow us to obtain some Spanish novel results and to provide additional evidence on the 
importance of factors investigated in previous studies. We uses a multivariate mixed 
proportional hazard model that allows for state dependence through lagged duration 
dependence in order to disentangle the effects of unobserved individual heterogeneity 
and the true state dependence after controlling for observable characteristics. We 
estimate the mixed proportional hazard model by the non-parametric maximum 
likelihood estimator of Heckman and Singer (1984). This analysis tries overcome many 
of the problems of the existing literature mentioned above. We do not make assumption 
on the distribution of the unemployment duration, we incorporate time varying 
covariates, we let the unobserved heterogeneity correlated across spells and we estimate 
simultaneously two unemployment spells under benefits. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly describe the Spanish 
Unemployment Compensation System. In section 3, we present the data. The model and 
the likelihood function in section 4. The variables and empirical results in section 5. 
Finally, we summarize our findings in the last section with the conclusions. Our 
findings suggest that as much the past unemployment experience as unobserved 
heterogeneity explain the influence of past unemployment duration on the length of 
future unemployment spells. However, we appreciate in workers with completed past 
unemployment spells that the correlation between the duration of succesive 
unemployment spells is due to the unobserved components across individuals. Besides, 
                                                                 
2 Most work in this area has investigated state dependence durations with panel data. Narendranathan and 
Elias (1993) find strong evidence of true state dependence i n unemployment occurrence for a cohort of 
young British men aged 23 in 1981.  Flaig et al.  (1993) and Muhleisen and Zimmerman (1994), using the 
first 6 waves of the German Socio economic Panel, find strong evidence of true state dependence for men 
during 1984 in both studies.  Arulampalam et al.  (1993) with the first five waves of the British Household 
Panel Survey for the period 1991-95 find strong evidence especially for mature men (defined as those 
aged 25 over 1991) and less evidence for younger men.    5
we see evidence t hat workers in their second unemployment experience under benefits 
present higher hazard rates that in their first unemployment experience under benefits. 
 
2. The Spanish Unemployment Compensation System. 
 
Before carrying out our analysis, it appears convenient to present concisely the main 
features of the Spanish Unemployment Compensation System (SIPRE, Sistema de 
Prestaciones por Desempleo). As in most OECD countries, there are basically two types 
of benefits in Spain: unemployment insurance (UI) and unemployment assistance (UA). 
An unemployed that loses a job and has a minimum contribution period of 6 months 
during the last 48 months receives unemployment insurance
3. The entitlement duration 
is calculated by dividing by 2 the number of months contributed, with the constraints 
that the result has to be an integer multiple
4 of 2. As for the level of income provided for 
the unemployed, it was determined by multiplying the gross replacement rate by the 
average of the “regulatory base” (i.e. the wage base used to calculate contributions and 
equal in principle to total wages) in the six months before entering unemployment. The 
monthly amount receive is the 80 per cent during the first six months of benefits (70 per 
cent after 1992) of the previous 6 monthly wage, the 70 per cent from the seventh to the 
twelfth month (60 per cent after 1992) and the 60 per cent from the thirteenth month 
onwards (60 per cent after 1992). Unemployment insurance are also subject to a floor 
equal to the statutory minimum wage (SMW) and a ceiling equal to 170 per cent of the 
SMW, which could be increased to 190 and 220 percent if the unemployed person have 
one child or more than one dependent children. These two factors implied that the “net” 
(i.e. after-tax) replacement rate could be much higher than the gross rates above, the 
difference being dependent upon the actual wages received while working. Since 1994 
the minimum has been reduced to 75% of the SMW unless the recipient has dependent 
children in which case it is still 100 % of the SMW.  
For those who have worked but not enough for unemployment insurance, or who 
have exhausted their insurance benefit, unemployment assistance is available
5. 
                                                                 
3 S ince 1992 a minimum of 12 months must have been worked during the last 72 months in order to 
receive any benefits. 
4 After 1992, the duration is calculated by dividing by 3 the number of months contributed, with the same 
constraint than before 1992. 
5 Workers having contributed less than 6 months in pre-1992 period or 12 months in post-1992 period 
were not entitled to unemployment insurance but they could claim unemployment assistance if they had 
contributed at least 3 months.   6
Unemployment assistance payments have no relation with the previous monthly wages. 
A family income criterion was also used whereby per capita family income could not 
exceed the SMW. A flat benefit equal to 75 per cent of the SMW was paid to all 
beneficiaries. Since 1993, these criteria have been tightened, as the notion of family has 
been restricted and the per member income requirement lowered to 75% of the SMW. In 
table 1 we show the entitlement duration benefits according to the period of 
contribution. 
 
3. The data set. 
 
Our sample set consists of a random sample drawn from the HSIPRE (Historico del 
Sistema de Prestaciones por Desempleo) data set that contains information on registered 
unemployed that receives all types of unemployment benefits from the Spanish 
Employment Agency (INEM). It registers claims of insurance and assistance benefits by 
all fully unemployed workers as well as some of those partially unemployed (i.e. on 
short time work). The advantage of the HSIPRE data is accurate information on days of 
unemployment insurance and assistance receipts, pre unemployment earnings, level of 
benefits, potential duration of benefits over time and information on several 
unemployment spells for the same individual. The importance of exact data is 
highlighted by the large agree of measurement error that has been found in the weeks 
unemployed variable  in some household surveys. Additionally, the unemployment 
insurance and unemployment assistance parameters, level of benefits and duration are 
often missing from other data sources, for example the Spanish Labour Force (EPA, 
Encuesta de Poblacion Activa).  Our data provides precise information on these key 
variables. The disadvantage of the data is that is not possible to determine the labour 
force status in the days after insurance and assistance benefits are exhausted and 
unfortunately, does not include information about marital status, industry and size of the 
firm in the previous job. 
To evaluate whether or not there is unemployment state dependence under benefits 
we consider a sample of young workers with age between 18 and 35 years old (greater 
than or  equal to 18 and less than or equal to 35), that enter to the Spanish 
Unemployment Compensation System and experience one or two unemployment spells 
under benefits during January 1984 and December 1991. Furthermore, we consider the   7
insurance and assistance  part of the system, but we only consider assistance benefits 
when individuals exhausted their insurance benefits
6. This sample restricts our total 
sample to be a set of the unemployment prone people under 35, so increase our 
information on the determinants of unemployment under benefits dependence and to 
reduce the effect of the error in initial conditions. As one of the criticism to the paper 
could be the problem of censoring in the study of lagged duration dependence, we have 
created an additional sample that contains workers with a completed past unemployment 
spell, because we do not know the true lagged duration but only a minimum level of it. 
In other words in the completed past unemployment sample we do not include workers 
who experience two unemployment spell and exhausted their benefits during the first 
unemployment spell. After making the sample selection described we have two 
samples: an entire sample and a completed past unemployment sample. The entire 
sample contains information of 175.103 workers who experience one unemployment 
spells and from these workers 69.782 have a second unemployment spell. In the 
completed past unemployment sample there are 131.002 workers who experience one 
unemployment spell and from these workers 25.681 had another second unemployment 
spell under benefits whose first unemployment spell was not exhausted. Background 
variables like age, gender, family burdens, information about the Unemployment 
Compensation System, job category and the wages in the last job are registered at the 
beginning of the spell. Characteristics for the individuals are reported in table 2 and 3. 
We observe that the unemployment entitlement spells are concentrated in periods 
less that 6 months in both samples. In the entire sample (we comment the completed 
past unemployment sample in brackets) the 55.2 per cent (45.3 per cent) of the workers 
have entitlement spells less than 6 months during their first unemployment spell and the 
59.1 per cent (50.6 per cent) during their second unemployment spell under  benefits. 
The average duration is approximately 270 days (302 days) for the unemployed in the 
first unemployment spell and 192 days (189 days) in the second unemployment spells 
under benefits. The entitlement duration is roughly 354 (415 days) and 285 days (321 
days) in the first and second unemployment spell respectively. The lagged duration is 
173 days in the entire sample and 171 days in the completed past unemployment 
sample. 
                                                                 
6 In future studies we will deal assistance benefits of workers who having contributed less than 6 months 
(12 months after 1992) were not entitled to UI benefits buy they could claim UA if they had contributed 
at least 3 months.   8
The average unemployed age that first enters to the unemployment compensation 
system is around 25 years old and recurrences with 26 (27 years old) years old. We 
appreciate that workers with a completed past unemployment spell under benefits 
remained longer periods in employment because they had their second unemployment 
spell with an older age. They pass from and average wage in the last employment of 67 
(69 thousand ptas per month) thousand pesetas per month in the first unemployment 
spell to 74 (78 thousand ptas per month) thousand pesetas per month during the second 
unemployment s pell. The level of benefits is 61 (62) and 67(69) thousand pesetas per 
month in the first and second occurrence in unemployment under benefits, respectively. 
Concerning to the exit from the unemployment compensation system, the 64.5 per 
cent (52.6 per cent) exhausted their benefits in the first unemployment spell and the 58.6 
per cent (44.1 per cent) in the second unemployment spell. Finally, we observe that the 
samples contain a high percentage of workers without family burdens and whose cause 
of unemployment was the end of the contract. Thus, the 87 per cent (85 per cent) have 
not family burdens in the first unemployment spell and the 78 (75 per cent) during the 
second unemployment spell. Regards the cause of unemployment, around the 97 and 98 
per cent enter to the unemployment compensation system by the end of the contract. 
Finally, to study in depth the patterns of months and the behaviour of the 
unemployed we present two additional analyses. First, we show the habitual empirical 
hazard through Kaplan Meier estimation in figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 gives the empirical 
hazard of workers who experience one or two unemployment spells under benefits and 
figure 2 the empirical hazard of workers who experience one or two unemployment 
spell under benefits and had a completed past unemployment spell. In both figures there 
are several periods where the empirical hazard is noticeably higher than surrounding 
periods. There is a high hazard in the first months, until approximately six months, 
probably caused by the high  concentration of short entitlement period mentioned above. 
There are jumps in multiple of three months probably caused by benefits exhaustion. 
We observe a positive duration dependence during the first periods and after that there 
is a negative duration dependence, this means that the exit rate increase at the beginning 
with the unemployment duration and decrease after a maximum being longer the 
unemployment duration. This suggests the need to include a flexible baseline hazard to 
model the unemployment duration. Finally, we appreciate that workers present higher 
probability of finding a job in the second unemployment spell than in the first 
unemployment spell in both figures, and combining the empirical hazard of figure 1 and   9
2 in figure 3, we observe that workers of the completed past unemployment sample have 
higher probability of finding a job than workers of the entire sample in the first and 
second unemployment spell under benefits. These last two points can be explained in 
the following way. First, workers who experience a second unemployment spell under 
benefits remain shorter durations in unemployment than workers who experience a first 
unemployment spell because present more job experience, receive more offers with 
higher wages and are more attractive for employers. Can be remained that workers, 
between their first and second unemployment spell experience under benefits, should 
have worked more than six months and it is like a paid training program that increase 
their skills habilities and their probability of finding a job. Second, workers in the entire 
sample present lower empirical hazard rates than workers in the completed past 
unemployment sample because the entire sample contains higher proportion of workers 
than exhausted the benefits and remained longer duration in unemployment under 
benefits. 
Finally, we present in tables 4 and 5 an original presentation of the determinants 
features of the unemployment duration based on the calculus of the gross hazard rates. 
For a complete illustration of this  novel method see Muro (2000). These tables contain 
in the first column the gross hazard rate from unemployment of an unemployed 
individual with a specific characteristic under the assumption that the hazard rate is 
constant along the unemployment duration  spells. We define the gross hazard, measures 
in percentage, as the probability that a worker find a job conditional that has been 
unemployed until the previous month. In this measurement we do not consider the 
ceteris paribus condition. In other words, we  do not consider the effect that other 
covariates have over the conditional probability of finding a job. Thus, if the reader 
wants to obtain the gross hazard rate of an unemployed with more than one 
characteristic must not be inferred from the tables 4 and 5. The second column presents 
the standard error associate to the estimator of the first column, and finally the third 
column shows a relative measure of the hazard rate for each category in a given variable 
concerning to the hazard rate of whatever individual without a specific characteristic. 
We will initially present some general results on the gross hazard rate, later we report 
results of individual and economic variables. 
As can be seen, in the first and second spell of workers who experience at least two 
unemployment spell under benefits in the entire sample, the gross monthly hazard rate 
of an individual without any specific characteristic, named whatever individual, is   10 
3.93% and 6.46 % in the first and second unemployment spell, respectively. For 
instance, if we assume that there is a cohort of 100 unemployed individuals who starts 
the unemployment spell in the same moment. From this cohort, the 3.93 per cent of the 
individuals find a job monthly in their first unemployment spell and the 6.46 % during 
their second unemployment spell. Thus, under the assumption of a constant exit rate 
assumed for the calculus of the gross hazard rate, the 50% of the unemployed 
individuals remain unemployed 17 months in their first unemployment spell and around 
35 months the 10% of the unemployed. In the second unemployment spell the 50% of 
the workers stay 10 months and the 10% of the unemployed individuals around 21 
months. The procedure is the same for the completed past unemployment sample. Thus, 
the 4.69 % of the individuals find a job monthly in their first unemployment spell and 
the 8.86 % during their second unemployment spell. We can affirm that the 50% of the 
unemployed individuals remain unemployed around 15 months in their first 
unemployment spell and around 2 9 months the 10%. However, in the second 
unemployment spell the 50% of the unemployed individuals stay 8 months and 
approximately 15 months the 10%. As can be observed, with the gross hazard rate 
procedure we appreciate two important features that we appreciated in figures 1, 2 and 
3. Thus, we see that workers in the second unemployment spell under benefits present 
higher gross hazard rates than in the first unemployment spell in both samples, and 
workers of the entire sample present lower gross hazard rate than in the completed past 
unemployment sample because contains higher proportion of workers that exhausted 
their benefits and remained longer duration in unemployment under benefits. Given that 
procedure is very simple, from now on we only comment the magnitude of the gross 
hazard rate. As in both samples, the entire sample and the completed past 
unemployment sample, the results are very similar, we only focus our comments in the 
entire sample. 
The main conclusions between the gross hazard rate and personal variables as 
gender, age, job category are the followings. In relation to the variable gender, males 
present a higher probability of finding a job than females in both spells. Thus, the gross 
hazard rate of males is 117.66% in males and 76.85% for females in the first spell. In 
the second spell the gross hazard rate is 129.21% in males and 68.32% in females. 
Concerning to the job category variables, we observe that workers who present better 
qualifications as high levels and associate professional technicians, foremen and 
supervisors have higher probability of finding a job than the rest of workers in both   11 
spells. Thus, the gross hazard rate of these better qualified workers is 186.13 % in the 
first spell and 146.37% in the second spell. Regards to the variable age, young workers 
present higher hazard rate from unemployment than old workers. The gross hazard rate 
of workers in the first spell (we comment the second spell in brackets) with age among 
18 and 22 years old is 141.26% (116.74%) in the first spell, the 133.52 % (109.89 %) 
among 22 and 26 years old, the 91.66% (99.06%) among 26 and 30 years old, the 
72.46% (92.54 %) among 30-35 years old and the 17.80% (79.80 %) for workers with 
more than 35 years old. 
Regards to the variables which measures the influence of the labor market conditions 
and the business cycle over the probability of finding a job in the workers, we have 
included the quarterly regional unemployment rate, the quarterly GDP rate and the 
cause of unemployment. We observe that workers who have registered in the 
unemployment compensation system by the end of the contract have higher exit rate. 
The percentage of the exit rate is the 102.19 in the first spell and the 100.41% in the 
second unemployment spell. The distribution of the exit rate  of the quarterly regional 
unemployment rate presents a relation in  ˙ form. Workers who lives in region with low 
and very high quarterly regional unemployment rate present lower exit rate that workers 
who live in regions with intermediate and high quarterly regional unemployment rate. In 
relation to the exit rate of the quarterly GDP rate, we observe that the exit rate is higher 
when increase the quarterly GDP rate in both unemployment spells. 
In relation to variables that affect the intensity of search as t he level of benefits, we 
observe that benefits present and incentive effect on the exit rate from unemployment. 
Thus, individuals who receive higher amount of benefits present higher exit rate from 
unemployment. We appreciate that unemployed individuals who receive more than 100 
thousand ptas per month have an gross hazard rate of 476.16% (292.48%) in the second 
spell as opposite to workers who receive less than 60 thousand ptas month whose exit 
rate is 75.81% (73.59 % in the second spell).  
Concerning to t he variables that affect the reservation wage as the wage in the last 
job, we appreciate that workers who perceived higher wages in the last job have higher 
gross hazard rate. The exit rate increases gradually when increase the amount of the 
wage in the last job. Thus, workers who earned more than 150 thousand ptas month in 
their last job have an gross hazard rate of 223.18 % (184.82% in the second spell), 
202.93 % (171.01 %) when earned among 125 and 150 thousand ptas month and   12 
decreases continuously in all the categories until the 77.69% (68.97%) for unemployed 
whose wages was less than 60 thousand ptas month. 
Finally, we observe that workers who experience shorter periods of unemployment 
under benefits in the first unemployment spell present higher gross  hazard rate from 
unemployment in the second spell. As can be seen, the gross hazard rate is 103.86 % for 
periods less than 3 months, 113.08 % among 3 and 6 months, and decrease gradually 
until 36.74% for workers who experienced a length in unemployment of  more than 24 
months. This result is consistent with the human capital decay theory. Workers with 
longer experiences in unemployment in the past lose work experience, are less attractive 
for the employers and have less probability of finding a job. 
 
4. The model. 
 
In the analysis of multiple unemployment spells, the probability of leaving the 
unemployment in subsequent unemployment spells is affected not only for the choice 
and the chance that Mortensen and Neuman (1989) mentioned, but also for the possible 
existence of state dependence between past and current unemployment spells duration. 
If we model the state dependence between unemployment spells duration exclusively 
through unobserved heterogeneity then current unemployment spell duration, 
conditional on observed and unobserved heterogeneity, will be independent of past 
unemployment spell duration. However, when individual’s labour history matters in 
explaining state dependence we may incorporate in our model the effect of human 
capital decay through lagged duration dependence. Perhaps the easiest way to do this is 
to allow the duration of current and past unemployment to lower the mean of the wage 
offer distribution because the workers have loss of valuable work experience in the 
unemployment. A decrease  in the mean of the offer distribution lowers the reservation 
wage by less than the change in the mean offer distribution as Lippman and McCall 
(1976) show. Following the above reasoning we predict that in the presence of human 
capital decay, the current and lagged unemployment spells duration diminishes the 
reemployment hazard rate. 
To study whether there is or not state dependence between past unemployment and 
future unemployment spells under benefits, we use a continuous mixed proportional 
model (mph) that allows for lagged duration dependence. The popularity of this models   13 
arise from at least three factors: First, these models can easily incorporate economics 
variables that change over time. Second, hazard models can incorporate incomplete 
(censored) unemployment spells. Third, these models allow one to examine how the 
probability of finding a job changes with the duration of the spell.  The model is in the 
class of mph model with multiple spells of a multivariate mph. The identification of 
mph models has been widely studied in the literature. For single spell models Elbers and 
Ridder (1982), Heckman and Singer (1984a), Ridder (1990). Extensions for multiple 
spells and multiple states can be found in Flinn and Heckman (1982, 1983), Heckman 
and Singer (1984b) and Honoré (1993).  We use the following proportional hazard 
representation for the transition rates from unemployment under benefits 
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where t ij is the duration of unemployment state i before exiting to the employment 
state j.  The specification given in equation (1) asserts that the rate of transition from 
unemployment under benefits i into employment j can be thought of as being influenced 
by three factors. The function  l0ij(tij) is named the baseline hazard function and captures 
the effect of the time elapsed in the unemployment states on the instantaneous 
probability of finding a job when all the factors held constant. The function  fij(X'(tij)bij) 
express the influence of time invariant and time variant covariates on the rate  transition 
from unemployment state i to employment state j. Finally, the function  Fij(q) accounts 
for the effects of unobserved heterogeneity components. All the three functions must be 
such that h ij(tij‰X(tij),q) is non-negative. Using an exponential representation for each 
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where  g0,  g1,  g2,  bij, c ij are parameters to be estimated, X ij(tij) is a 1 ·K vector of 
exogenous variables, bij is a K·1 vector of coefficients.
7  
The equation (2) for the baseline hazard function is a very general specification that 
minimizes the likelihood of having a misspecified model. It contains special cases of the 
most utilized hazard functions. For example, if  g2ij=0, corresponds to the hazard 
function of a Gompertz model. If  g1ij=g2ij=0 the baseline hazard function would 
correspond to an exponential distribution. Furthermore, let a positive duration 
dependence ( g1ij>0), a initial positive duration dependence eventually followed by 
negative duration dependence (g1ij>0 y  g2ij<0) as predict Jovanovic (1979) or a negative 
duration dependence followed by a positive duration dependence ( g1ij<0 y  g2ij>0)  as 
predict Meyer (1990). Besides, the empirical hazard analyzed in the previous section 
suggests to model the effect of the unemployment duration with this type of flexible 
baseline function. 
The effects of the unobserved heterogeneity are captured by the  use of the one 
parameter given in the equation (4). We assume that  q to be fixed across spells for a 
given worker and to have a distribution G(.) across workers. We also assume q to be a 
positive random variable with range (0,¥). Furthermore, we allow individual 
heterogeneity components vary across states. Thus, c ij (factor loading) are parameters 
that represent specific transition intensities between different states that are correlated 
across spells. For example, unobserved heterogeneity component may have a negative 
or positive correlated effect depending, respectively, on whether or no c ij is negative or 
positive. Then, allowing the factor loadings to differ across consecutive spells of an 
event builds in the possibility of state dependence in the distribution of unobservables. 
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7 The interpretation of  bij, the coefficients of the covariates, is similar to that of a regression model, for 
each additional unit change in the value of X ij the logarithm of the hazard changes by bij, ceteris paribus. 
A more intuitive interpretation is obtained by exponentiation the coefficient and computing t he value 
{exp(bij)-1}·100. The interpretation is that for each unit change in the covariate X ij, the rate of transition 
from unemployment state i into employment state j into changes by a percentage equal to  {exp(bij)-1} 
100.   15 
The survival function based on (5) is 
 
( ) ￿ - =
ij t
ij 0 ij ij 0ij ij ij ij ij du ) t ( X ' exp( (u) exp ) ), t ( X | (t S q b l q       (6) 
 
Moreover, the density f unction of the exit rate from unemployment under benefits 
spell i to employment spell j is 
 
), ), t ( | (t S ) ), t ( | (t h ) ), t ( | (t f ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij q q q X X X · =         (7) 
 
4.1 The likelihood function and estimation method. 
 
To study whether there is or not state dependence with the samples described in the 
previous section, we consider two types of likelihood functions, one likelihood function 
for the entire sample which contain information of workers with one or two 
unemployment spells under benefits, and another likelihood function for the complete 
past u nemployment sample that include information of workers with one or two 
unemployment spells and had a completed past unemployment spell. In the entire 
sample, we may observe until six different components depending on whether the 
present and the past unemployment spell are completed or not. Thus, there are workers 
who has only one unemployment spell and quit the system to work (1) or exhaust their 
benefits (2), workers with two unemployment spells that: may find a job during the first 
and second unemployment spell under benefits (3) or find a job in the first 
unemployment spell and exhaust the benefits during the second unemployment spell 
under benefits (4), exhaust their benefits in the first spell and quit the system to work 
during the second unemployment s pell (5), or exhaust their first and second 
unemployment spell under benefits (6). Thus, the correct likelihood function should be, 
see appendix 1, 
 
L(t1,t2,X(tij),q) =  [ ] [ ]






i1 i2 i1 ) ), X(t , S(C ) ), X(t , f(t
-
=
· ￿ q q · 
      · { } { } [ ]
) d )(1 d (1 d
i2 i1 i2 i2
i2 i1 i3 ) ), X(t , f(t ) ), X(t , f(t
- - · q q · 
      · { } { } [ ]
) d )(1 d )(1 d (1
i2 i1 i2 ti2
i3 i2 i1 ) ), X(t , f(t ) ), X(t , S(C
- - - · q q ·   16 
      · { } { } [ ]
) d )(1 d )(1 d (1 d
i2 ti1 i2 i2
i3 i2 i1 i4 ) ), X(t , S(C ) ), X(t , f(t
- - - · q q · 
· { } { } [ ]
) d )(1 d )(1 d )(1 d (1
i2 ti1 i2 i2
i4 i3 i2 i1 ) ), X(t , S(C ) ), X(t , S(t
- - - - · q q   (8) 
 
where d i1 is a dummy variable that distinguishes uncensored duration of recipients 
who receive benefits and quit the system to work during their first unemployment spell 
and disappear of the record for ever. The dummy variable d i2 discriminates censored 
duration of workers who exhaust their insurance benefit and disappear of the record
8. 
The dummy variable d i3 let separate between uncensored and censored duration of 
recipients who quit the system to work during the first unemployment spell and find a 
job or exhaust the benefits during the second unemployment spell. Finally the dummy 
variable d i4 distinguish between uncensored and censored duration of recipients who 
exhausted their benefits during their f irst unemployment spell and exhaust the benefit or 
exit to a job in their second unemployment spell. 
The contribution of the first and second component in (8) is the value of the density 
function and the survival function in the first unemployment spell, f (ti1) and S(Cti1) 
respectively. The contribution of the third and fourth component is the product of the 
density function f(ti2) and the density function f(ti1), and the survival function S(tti2) and 
the density function f(ti1), respectively. Finally, the  fifth and sixth component is the 
product of the survival function S(Cti2) and the survival function S(Cti1), and the product 
of the density function f(ti2) and the survival function S(Ci1), respectively. 
In relation to the sample that contain information o f workers with a completed past 
unemployment spell, the likelihood function does not contain the last two components. 
In other words, this likelihood function does not include workers who exhaust their 
benefits  in the first spell and quit the system to work during the second unemployment 
spell, or exhaust their first and second unemployment spell under benefits. Thus, the 
likelihood function is 
 
L(t1,t2,X(tij),q) =  [ ] [ ]
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8 We do not know if exit to employment, unpaid unemployment or out of the labor force.   17 
 
For b oth likelihood functions, the individual contribution to the likelihood function 
obtained by integrating out q is 
 









ij i ) ( dG ) , ) X(t | ( L
i q
q q j          (10) 
 
where G(q) is the distribution function for q and Q is the range of  q. The parameter 
estimates are obtained by maximizing the likelihood function across all the periods, and 
where  j=  ￿g0ij,  g1ij,  g2ij,  bij, c ij￿ are permitted to depend on the origin state. This 
likelihood function allows time varying regressors, right censoring, lagged durations. I t 
solves the left censoring or initial condition problems by assuming that the functional 
form of the initial duration distribution for each origin state is different from that of the 
other spells as Heckman and Singer (1984c) proposed. To completed the specification 
of the likelihood function, we should specify the distribution function G(￿) for the 
unobserved heterogeneity component. In the literature, exist two approaches. One is 
based in assume parametric distribution for G(￿)- for example a gamma distribution- and 
estimate  j after integrating the likelihood function over all values of  q. This method is 
the most commonly used but there is a disadvantage that is requiring the knowledge of 
the appropriate parametric form. If there is an incorrect specification for the G(￿) 
function, the estimates of the effects of duration terms and covariates will be 
inconsistent, see Heckman and Singer (1984c). These authors propose another approach, 
that we use in this paper and not require a prior parametric specification for unobserved 
heterogeneity components. It approximates the unknown probability distribution by a 
finite support points, and use the data to determinate the location and the probability 
mass associated with each support point. The basic procedure is to estimate a model 
with i points of support, starting with i=1 (which is just a model without heterogeneity), 
and adding points of support until the estimated model becomes singular. Because of the 
presence of an intercept and a factor loading we fix, without loss of generality, all the 
points to be on the unit interval and estimate the location and probability associated with 
each support point noting that the cumulative mass over all support points mass sum 1. 
Therefore, we estimate the parameters of the m odel by the non-parametric maximum   18 
likelihood estimator
9 (NPMLE) of Heckman and Singer (1984c) from the marginal 
likelihood function in (9) with a nonparametric distribution for the unobserved 
heterogeneity component and a quadratic form for the baseline e xit. To estimate the 
parameters of the model we use the CTM (Continuous Time Model) program developed 
by Yi, Honoré and Walker (1987). The estimation procedure involves jointly 
determining the values of the parameter vector j and the support points that characterize 
the underlying distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity component  q. Conditional 
on the number of support points, the maximum likelihood estimates of  j asymptotically 
have all the desirable properties of an extremun estimator, consistency and asymptotic 
normality, Amemiya (1985). We achieve the empirical investigation in the next section. 
 
5. An empirical investigation. 
 
Before going further into the empirical results, we consider convenient a simple 
analysis in order to obtain information on the influence of our variables on the 
individual probability of leaving the unemployment state under benefits. Specifically, 
we are interested in trying to assess if the individuals face different probabilities and if 
there are factors which can explain i t. According to this we will use the hazard model 
methodology. In the context of multiple unemployment spells the exit probability of 
finding a job depends not only of the probability of receiving job offer and the 
probability than such offer will be accepted by an unemployed but also of the possible 
state dependence between past and current unemployment spells duration. 
The probability of receiving job offers will depend on personal characteristics as 
gender, age and educational level or qualification. Specifically, we can expect that age 
is related to the probability of finding a job with an inverted U form if the youngest and 
the oldest group have lower productivity with respect to the wages paid. We also 
include in our model a quadratic term to capture an inverted U form on the probability 
of finding a job. The job category is a variable of the National Insurance contribution 
group, which combines occupation and education. We expect that workers who present 
better qualifications have higher probability of finding a job because can receive more 
                                                                 
9 The NPMLE procedure based on (9) can be shown  to be consistent in the presence of  q with lagged 
unemployment duration in X. Besides, the procedure can be shown to be consistent for multiple spell 
data.   19 
labour offers. With respect to the effect of the gender over the exit probability of finding 
a job, we think that is ambiguous. 
The probability of receiving job offers will also depend on variables that indicate the 
local labour market conditions to the individual. We can try to measure the labour 
market conditions with two variables. The regional unemployment rate (quarterly) and 
the cause of unemployed whether end of contract or other (layoffs, etc) let give us an 
idea about the state of the labour demand. The regional unemployment rate indicates the 
local labour market conditions to the workers. We expect that workers who live in 
regions with lower regional unemployment rate have higher probability of finding a job 
because there are more vacancies. 
To have registered in the Unemployment Compensation System by the end of the 
contract have two different effects on the probability of finding a job: First, the 
unemployed who entered by this cause start to search a new job before the end of the 
contract because know the date of the extinction of his job. Second, he could probably 
access to benefits at the future, and this helps him to search with intensity.  
In addition, the intensity of job search is an important variable to explain the 
probability of receiving job offers. In this respect, the income that an individual can earn 
in unemployment and the entitlement duration (in days) are element that may influence 
the search effort and therefore, the probability of finding a  job and the duration of 
unemployment spells. In our data the entitlement period goes from three months until 
twenty-four months for the unemployment insurance spells and may extend until forty 
eight months when the workers access to unemployment assistance (after they 
exhaustion of the unemployment insurance). As we can expect, the probability of 
finding a job will be higher among workers who have longer entitlement period because 
have more time to search, to assess and to accept job offers. However, some empirical 
studies, among them Meyer (1990), consider than the probability is constant or 
decreasing in the earlier unemployment months and rises dramatically just prior to 
benefits lapse because the value of being unemployed and the reservation wage 
decrease. The disincentive effect is produced at the beginning of the unemployment 
spells and will be dominated by the incentive effect. To know the temporal exit to job, 
we have included in the model a variable to capture the effect of the days before the 
entitlement period expires. This variable is the duration until the exhaustion of the 
entitlement duration (subtraction between entitlement and current unemployment   20 
duration under benefits). Furthermore, we have included a quadratic form to get unlineal 
effect on the exit rate. 
In relation to the income of the unemployed, we can obtain the replacement rate 
dividing the benefit during the unemployment episode by the income they received as a 
wage during their last employment spell. However, due to short variability of the 
replacement rate, we analyze separately the effect of the time varying unemployment 
benefits
10 and the wage of the last job. This type of specification has previously utilized 
by Meyer (1990), and Katz and Meyer (1990). The level of benefits predicts a double 
effect on intensity of search and on the probability of leaving unemployment. First, 
incentive effect occurs when the amount of benefits increases the intensity of search and 
the reemployment hazards, see Tannery (1983). Second, a disincentive effect occurs 
when high benefits causing the unemployed to be less willing to accept jobs. 
Moreover, the probability that a worker may accept job offer will depend on the 
factors that affect his reservation wage. Concerning to the variables that affect the 
reservation wages we have information of the last wage and family burdens. The 
income of the employed reflects the incentive or disincentive effect on search and 
acceptance of job offer when they are unemployed, see Lancaster (1979). So, workers 
with higher (lower) wages in their last job have a negative effect (positive) on the 
reemployment hazard because have a higher reservation wage. With regard to the family 
burdens (which is defined in terms of the number of dependent people- spouse or other 
relation- if the total income of household divided by the number of members is below 
the minimum wage), this variable is very important because one situation in which 
recipients can get assistance benefits is when they exhaust insurance benefits and have 
family b urdens. Then, we can expect that having family burdens reduce the probability 
of finding a job because workers know that may obtain a new benefit and no accept 
uninteresting jobs. In the opposite sense to have family burdens increase search effort 
and the acceptability of a given offer. 
We also have included four dummies variables according to the quarter of exit from 
unemployment under benefits and the quarter of entry to the unemployment 
compensation system to analyze the possible seasonal effect in the S panish economy 
and the calendar time effect, respectively. 
                                                                 
10 We have include the level of benefits as time varying covariate because decrease with the 
unemployment duration spell: 80 per cent during the first six months of benefits, 70 per cent from the 
seventh to the twelfth month and 60 per cent from the thirteenth month onward.   21 
To know the possible true unemployment state dependence between past and future 
unemployment spells we have considered in the model that explain the second 
unemployment  spell the lagged unemployment duration under benefits to capture the 
effects of human capital decay. Workers suffer a loss of human capital decay when they 
experience an unemployment spell or because their past unemployment spell is used as 
a signal by employers about their low productivity. We expect that out models predict 
that lagged unemployment duration has a negative effect on the exit rate.  
Finally, we have included in our models the GDP growth rate (quarterly) to control 
for business cycle influence and the factor loading that captures the sign of the effect of 
the unmeasured variables. We expect that the GDP will have a positive effect on the exit 
rate from unemployment. Concerning the factor loading as an omitted person specific 
effect that arises from pure heterogeneity, a llowing the factor loadings to differ across 
consecutive spells of an event (unemployment spell) builds in the possibility of state 
dependence in the distribution of unobservables. 
With the variables described above we have estimated two models based on the 
likelihood function (8) and (9) by the non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator of 
Heckman and Singer (1984c). Table 6 presents the results. The first and second columns 
show the joint estimations results of workers with one or two unemployment spell  under 
benefits. The third and fourth columns present the joint estimation results of workers 
with one or two unemployment spells and had a completed past unemployment spell 
under benefits. Our objective is to assess the importance of the unobserved 
heterogeneity and the human capital decay hypothesis in explaining the state 
dependence between unemployment states under benefits. The age (and quadratic form), 
quarterly regional unemployment rate, quarterly GDP rate, level of benefits and duration 
until the exhaustion of the benefits (and quadratic form) are included as time varying 
covariates. The variable unemployment duration and duration until the exhaustion of the 
benefits (and cuadratic form) are measured in days, and the lagged unemployment in 
months. The reference individual is a male, skilled clerical workers without family 
burdens who enters unemployment for other reasons (not end of contract), and enter and 
exit from the system in the third quarter of the year. 
We will first present our results concerning lagged term and unobserved 
heterogeneity components, later we report the rest of the results. We appreciate in the 
estimations of the entire sample a negative and significant coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable that suggest the evidence of true state dependence between   22 
unemployment states for young workers under benefits. This result is consistent with 
the human capital decay theory. The past unemployment experience has a significant 
effect in the future unemployment behaviour of the workers.  Workers with higher 
experiences in past unemployment spells whatever the circumstances lose work 
experience, are less attractive for the employers and has less probability of finding a job, 
see Vishwanath (1989). Furthermore, employers may use the past unemployment 
experience as a signal of productivity and those with longer unemployment periods are 
stigmatized, see Lockwood (1991) and Omori (1997). However, we do not observe in 
the estimations of workers with a completed past unemployment spell that past 
unemployment duration causes future unemployment durations. Thus, for these workers 
the human capital decay theory does not exist. The explanation could be found in the 
composition of the sample. While the entire sample contains durations of workers with 
incomplete an complete past unemployment spells, the completed past unemployment 
sample only contains information of workers who quit the unemployment compensation 
system to work during their first unemployment spell. These workers present less loss 
work experience, are not stigmatized by employers and therefore their past 
unemployment experience does not influence in their future probability of finding a job. 
We see from table 6 that the coefficient of the unobserved heterogeneity is positive 
and significant from "0" at the 5% level in all the estimations. Further, three support 
points are sufficient to approximate the probability distribution of the unobserved 
heterogeneity component. The estimated support points are 0, 0.8 and 1 with cumulative 
probability  masses 0.47, 0.8 and 1, respectively for the entire sample and 0.7, 0.8 and 1, 
respectively for the sample of workers who contain a completed past unemployment 
spell. Therefore, the unmeasured individual characteristics influence the probability of 
experiencing future unemployment spells under benefits. Thus, we can affirm that both 
explanations, the true state and spurious state dependence are among the causes that 
influence the relationship between future and past unemployment spells in the entire 
sample  but when we consider workers with completed past unemployment spells, only 
the omitted person specific component affect the correlation between past and future 
unemployment spells under benefits. 
We present now the main results on the effect of variables of current unemployment 
spells on the exit rate. Concerning the effect of business cycle on unemployment spell 
duration, the coefficient of GDP rate (quarterly) shows a positive effect on the 
probability of exiting from paid unemployment to employment as we expected. In   23 
seasons with high quarterly GDP rate the exit from unemployment increase because 
firms create new vacants and offer better wages. Otherwise, the lower the quarterly 
GDP rate the higher the probability of exiting from unemployment under benefits. In 
relation with the coefficient of the quarterly regional unemployment rate presents a 
positive effect on the probability of finding a job in both samples. In regions with higher 
unemployment rate the workers present higher turnover with short employment spells 
that allows only for a relatively short entitlement periods. In these regions dominate 
agriculture and services structure. 
The level of benefits present a positive effect on the probability of exiting from 
unemployed under benefits in all the estimations. Althought the standard results is that 
high benefits causing the unemployed to be less willing to accept jobs and continue 
longer periods unemployed. The incentive effect of the insurance benefit could be 
justified by the two following arguments: First, the benefits increase the resources 
devoted to search and hence increase the probability of return to work, see Tannery 
(1983), Ben Horim and Zuckerman (1987). Second, given the characteristics of the 
Spanish Unemployment Compensation System where the amount of benefits decrease 
with the unemployment duration after six months and as the hazard is higher in the first 
months until approximately 6 months. Hence, we can affirm that recipients who search 
with more intensity and get a job sooner , receive higher benefits than the others 
because they are less penalized due to their shorter unemployment durations.  
Concerning to the influence of the last wage on the probability of finding a job, we 
see that in all the estimations, the recipients who received higher wages in their last job 
has less probabity of exiting from unemployment. This coefficient confirm that worker 
with higher reservation wages demanding better labour offers and are less likely to exit 
from the system. 
Regards to the variable days until the exhaustion of the benefits and the quadratic 
form, we observe that recipients rises their probability of finding a job just prior to 
benefits lapse as Meyer (1990) mentioned. 
In relation to the baseline exit we appreciate that the unemployment duration and its 
quadratic form has a positive and negative influence on the logarithm of the rate of 
transition to a job, respectively. At the beginning there is a positive duration 
dependence, the exit grows with the unemployment duration because unemployed 
increase their intensity of search or decrease their reservation wage, but after a 
maximum decrease the probability of exiting to a job and hereafter there is a negative   24 
dependence duration, because employers use employment histories as a sorting device 
or because those youths with longer spells become more discouraged. 
Concerning to the job category parameters, we observe that the highly educated 
worker  - high level and associate professional technicians, foremen and supervisors- 
present more probability o f finding a job that the less educated worker in all the 
estimations. 
Regards to the cause of unemployment, workers who have entered unemployed by 
ending the contract in the last job have a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of finding a job. The unemployed who entered by this cause start to search a 
new job before the end of the contract because know the date of the extinction of his job 
or because they could probably access to benefits an future, and this helps him to search 
with more intensity. 
In relation with the dummies that control the seasonal effect of the Spanish economy, 
we appreciate that during the third quarter of every year workers present lower 
probability of finding a job. Given the conditions of an economy like Spanish economy 
where agriculture and services dominate the economic structure and present higher 
turnover with short employment spells, workers have relatively higher probability of 
getting a contract just before summer and Christmas but not during the months of 
summer (July, August and September). In different way, workers who enter to the 
unemployment compensation system present in this quarter shorter duration in 
unemployment under benefits. 
Finally, we observe that the women and the youngest unemployed individual p resent 
less probability in the future to secure employment and has less probability of exiting 




In this paper we provide answers to the question if past unemployment cause future 
unemployment. In particular we investigate  whether or not there is evidence of state 
dependence for the Spanish young workers. To analize this fact we use a mixed 
proportional hazard that allows for state dependence through lagged duration 
dependence in order to disentangle the effects of the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity and the true unemployment state dependence. We estimate the model by   25 
the non parametric maximum likelihood estimator proposed by Heckman and Singer 
(1984) with a flexible especification for the baseline exit and unobserved heterogeneity 
components. Using a sample of young workers that comes from administrative data 
records collected by the Spanish Employment Agency (INEM), we have found evidence 
that the experience of past unemployment (true state dependence) and the unobserved 
individual components (spurious state dependence) affect the experience of longer 
future unemployment spells. However, if we consider workers with completed past 
unemployment spells (less loss of human capital decay), we appreciate that have the 
same chance of reemployment no matter how long or short these periods of past 
unemployment have been and only the correlation between the duration of succesive 
unemployment spells is due to the unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. 
Second, we observe evidence that workers who experience a second unemployment 
spell under benefits remain shorter durations in unemployment than workers who 
experience a first unemployment spell. This effect can be explained because workers, 
between their first and second unemployment spell experience under benefits, should 
have worked more than six months and it is like a paid training program that increase 
their skills habilities and their probability of finding a job 
Third, workers in the entire sample present lower empirical hazard rates than workers 
in the completed past unemployment sample because the entire sample contains higher 
proportion of workers than exhausted the benefits and remained longer duration in 
unemployment under benefits. 
Fourth, we also find evidence that the business cycle and local labour conditions 
have influence on the reemployment probability of exiting out of unemployment under 
benefits.  
Finally, we appreciate that there is a seasonal effect in the Spanish economy during 
the third quarter of every year because workers present lower probability of finding a 
job in relation with the rest of the quarters. Given the conditions of an economy like 
Spanish economy where agriculture and services dominate the economic structure, 
workers have relatively higher probability of getting a contract in all the months just 
before the summer and Christmas but not in the months of July, August and September 
(the summer months). 
Our finding that past unemployment cause future unemployment has an important 
implications for p olicy, thus it seems that, at least in the conditions of an economy like 
the Spanish economy, with high overall rates of unemployment and persistent   26 
differences in regional unemployment rates, a combination of short-term 
macroeconomic policies to alter the equilibrium, or natural rate, of unemployment and 
microeconomic policies targeted towards specific collectives, e.g. young people, 
females, unskilled workers, workers with longer past unemployment spells may be an 
effective cocktail of unemployment measures that could contribute to reduce recurrent 
unemployment and his effect over the possible crisis of welfare System. 
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Appendix. 
 
A.1 Likelihood function for the entire sample. 
 
The likelihood functions of the sample that contain information of workers who 
experience one or two unemployment spells under benefits contain six components. 
There are workers who has only one unemployment spell and quit the system to work 
(1) or exhaust their benefits (2), workers with two unemployment spells that: may find a 
job in their first and second unemployment spell under benefits (3) or find a job in the 
first unemployment spell and exhaust their benefits in the second unemployment spell 
(4), exhaust their benefits in the first spell and quit the system to work during the second 
unemployment spell (5), or exhaust their first and second unemployment spell under 
benefits (6). Thus, the likelihood function for this type of data would be 
 
Pr(t1, Ct1; t2, Ct2)= P1(t1, Ct1)·P2(t2, Ct2| t1) · P2(t2, Ct2| Ct1) 
=Pr(T=t1,d1=1)·Pr(T=Ct1,d1=0,d2=1)·Pr(T=t2,d1=d2=0,d3=1)· 
·Pr(T=Ct2,d1=d2=d3=0) · Pr(T=t2,d1=d2=d3=0,d4=1) ·  
· Pr(T=Ct2,d1=d2=d3=d4=0). 
 













The second term 
Pr(T=Ct1,d1=0,d2=1)=Pr(T=Ct1| d1=0,d2=1,) · Pr(d1=0, d2=1)= 
=Pr (t1>Ct1)=S(Ct1). 
 
The third term 
Pr (T=t2,d1=0,d2=0,d3=1)= Pr(T=t2|d1=0,d2=0,d3=1) · Pr(d1=0,d2=0,d3=1)=  
=Pr(t2<Ct2) ·Pr(t1<Ct1)= f(t2) ·f(t1). 
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The fourth term 
Pr (T=Ct2,d1=0,d2=0,d3=0)= Pr(T=Ct2|d1=0,d2=0,d3=0) · · Pr(d1=0,d2=0,d3=0)= 
=Pr (t2>Ct2) ·Pr(t1<Ct1)= S(Ct2) ·f(t1). 
 
The fifth term is 
Pr (T=t2,d1=d2=d3=0,d4=1)= Pr(T=t2|d1=d2=d3=0,d4=1) · · Pr(d1=d2=d3=0,d4=1)= 
=Pr (t2<Ct2) ·Pr(t1>Ct1)= f(t2) ·S(Ct1). 
 
Finally the last component is 
Pr (T=Ct2,d1=d2=d3=d4=0)= Pr(T=Ct2|d1=d2=d3=d4=0) · · Pr(d1=d2=d3=d4=0)= 
=Pr (t2>Ct2) ·Pr(t1>Ct1)= S(t2) ·S(Ct1). 
 
Regrouping the terms, the likelihood function for "n" individual would be 
L(t1,t2,X(tij),q) =  [ ] [ ]






i1 i2 i1 ) ), X(t , S(C ) ), X(t , f(t
-
=
· ￿ q q · 
      · { } { } [ ]
) d )(1 d (1 d
i2 i1 i2 i2
i2 i1 i3 ) ), X(t , f(t ) ), X(t , f(t
- - · q q · 
      · { } { } [ ]
) d )(1 d )(1 d (1
i2 i1 i2 ti2
i3 i2 i1 ) ), X(t , f(t ) ), X(t , S(C
- - - · q q · 
      · { } { } [ ]
) d )(1 d )(1 d (1 d
i2 ti1 i2 i2
i3 i2 i1 i4 ) ), X(t , S(C ) ), X(t , f(t
- - - · q q · 
· { } { } [ ]
) d )(1 d )(1 d )(1 d (1
i2 ti1 i2 i2
i4 i3 i2 i1 ) ), X(t , S(C ) ), X(t , S(t
- - - - · q q   (8) 
   29 
References.  
 
Amemiya, T. (1985), "Advanced Econometrics",  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Arulampalam, W., Alison L. Booth and M. P. Taylor (1998), " Unemployment 
Persistence", University of Essex Working Paper, No. 98/19, February. 
Ben-Horim, M. and Zuckerman, D. (1987), " The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on 
Unemployment Duration", Journal of Labour Economics, July, 5(3), 386-390. 
Elbers, C. and Ridder, G. (1982), “True and Spurious Duration Dependence: The 
Identifiability of the Proportional Hazard Model”,  Review of Economic Studies, 49, 
403-440. 
Flaig, G., Licht, G. and Steiner, V. (1993)," Testing for State Dependence Effects in a 
Dynamic Model of Male Unemployment Behaviour", in H Bunzel, P. Jensen and N. 
Westergard-Nielsen (eds), Panel Data and Labour Market Dynamics, North Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
Flinn, C. and Heckman, J. (1982), “Models for the Analysis of Labor Force Dynamics”, 
in: R.Basmann and G.Rhodes, eds.,  Advances in Econometrics, Vol. 1 (JAI Press, 
Greenwich, CT), 35-95. 
Flinn,C. and J. Heckman (1983),” The Likelihood Function for the Multistate-
Multiepisode Model in Models for the analysis of Labor Force dynamics”, R. 
Bassman and G. Rhodes, eds.,  Advances in Econometrics, Vol.3. ( JAI Press, 
Greenwich, CT.). 
Ham, J.C. and Lalonde, R.J. (1996), " The Effect of Sample Selection and Initial 
Conditions in Duration Models: Evidence From Experimental Data on Training", 
Econometrica, vol. 64, No. 1, 175-205. 
Heckman, J. and Borjas G. I. (1980), “Does Unemployment Causes Future 
Unemployment? Definitions, Questions and Answers for a Continuous Time Model 
of Heterogeneity and State Dependence”, Economica, 47, 247-285. 
Heckman, J. and Singer, B. (1984a), "The Identifiability of the Proportional Hazard 
Model", Review of Economic and Studies, 52, 231-243. 
Heckman, J. and Singer, B. (1984b), “Econometric Duration Analysis”  Journal of 
Econometrics, 24, 63-132.   30 
Heckman, J. and Singer, B. (1984c), “A Method for Minimizing the Impact of 
Distributional Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data”, 
Econometrica, 52, 271-320. 
Heckman, J., Hotz, V.J. and Walker, J., (1985), “New Evidence on the Timing and 
Spacing of Births” American Economic Review, 75, 179-184. 
Honoré, B. (1993), “Identification Results for Duration Models with Multiple Spells”, 
Review of Economic Studies, 60, 241-246. 
Jain, D. and Vilcassim, N. J. (1991),” Investigating Household Purchase Timing 
Decisions: A conditional Hazard Function Approach”, Marketing Science,10, 1-23. 
Jovanovic, B. (1979), " Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover, Journal of Political 
Economy, 87, 972-990. 
Katz, L.F. and Meyer, B. (1990), "Unemployment Insurance Recall Expectations, and 
Unemployment Outcomes",  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 973-
1002. 
Lancaster, R. (1979), ”Econometric Methods for the Duration of Unemployment”, 
Econometrica, 47, 939-956. 
Lippman, S.A., and Mc Call, J. J. (1976).” The economics of job search: A survey”, 
Economic Inquiry 14, 155-367. 
Lockwood, B. (1991), “ Information Externalities in the Labour Market and the 
Duration of Unemployment”, Review of Economic Studies, July, 733-753. 
Lynch, L. M. (1985), “State Dependency in Youth Unemployment”,  Journal of 
Econometrics, 28, 71-84. 
Lynch, L. M. (1989), “ The Youth Labor Market in the Eighties : Determinants of Re-
employment Probabilities for Young Men and Women“,  Review of Economics and 
Statistics, February, 37-45. 
Meyer, B. D. (1990), “ Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells“, 
Econometrica, July, 123-176. 
Mortensen, D. T. and Neumann, G. R. (1989).” Choice or chance ? A structural 
Interpretation of Individual Labor Market Histories”, Studies in Labor Market 
Dynamics.G.R.Neumann and N.C.Westergaard-Nielsen. 
Muro, J. (2000), " Cambios d e Posicion en la Trayectoria Laboral de los Individuos", 
Mimeo. 
Muthleisen, M. And K.F.Zimmerman (1994)," A Panel Analysis of Job Changes and 
Unemployment", European Economic Review, 38, 793-801.   31 
Narendranathan, W. and Elias, P. (1993), " Influences of Past History on the Incidence 
of Youth Unemployment: Empirical Findings for the U.K.",  Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 55 (2), 161-185. 
Omori, Y. (1996), “ Stigma Effects of Nonemployment: Theory and Evidence  “, 
Working Paper 164, Faculty of Economics, Toyama University. 
Omori, Y. (1997), “ Stigma Effects of Nonemployment”,  Economic Inquiry, Vol. 
XXXV, April, 394-416. 
Ridder, G. (1990),” The non-Parametric Identification of Generalized Hazard Models”, 
Review of Economics Studies, 57, 167-182.  
Tannery, F. (1983), "Search Effort and Unemployment Insurance Reconsidered ", 
Journal of Human Resources, vol. 18, 432-440. 
Trivedi, P.K., and Alexander J.N. (1989),” Reemployment Probability and Multiple 
Unemployment Spells: A Partial Likelihood Approach “,  Journal of Business And 
Economic Statistics, July, 395-401. 
Vishwanath, T. (1989), “Job Search, Stigma Effect, and Scape Rate from 
Unemployment”, Journal of Labour Economics 4, 487-502. 
Yi, K-M, Bo Honore, and Walker, J. (1987), "A Program for the Estimation and Testing 
of Continuous Time Multi State Multi Spell Models", Program Manual. Chicago: 




   32 
 
Table 1. Pre - 1992 period. 
 
Unemployment assistance after exhausted U.I. 
With family burdens  Without family burdens 
Contribution period (C). 
(Over the last 4 years) 
Entitlement U. I. 
(2 · ·  integer (C/3)) 
< 45 years   ‡ ‡ 45 years  <45 years  ‡ ‡45 years 
3 months   -  3 months  3 months      
4 months   -  4 months  4 months      
5 months   -  5 months  5 months      
From 6 to 12months  3 months   18 months  24 months  -  - 
From 12 to 18 months  6 months   24 months   30 months  -  - 
From 18 to 24 months  9 months   24 months  30 months   -  - 
From 24 to 30 months  12 months   24 months  30 months  -  6 months 
From 30 to 36 months  15 months   24 months  30 months   -  6 months 
From 36 to 42 months  18 months   24 months  30 months   -  6 months 
From 42 to 48 months  21 months   24 months  30 months   -  6 months 
48 months  24 months   24 months  6+30 months  -  6+6 months 
> 52 years  -  Up to retirement 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics variables of unemployed who has one or two 
unemployment spells under benefits. The entire sample. 
 
  First spell.  Second spell. 
Covariates.  Dummy.  Mean.  Std.  %.   Mean.  Std.  %.  
Gender.               
Male.        55.7      58.7 
Female.        44.3      41.3 
Age (years).               
Entry age.    24.93  4.15  100  26.72  4.34  100 
Exit age.    25.68  4.41  100  27.25  4.43  100 
Exit age square.    678.92  235.60  100  762.46  251.71  100 
Family Burdens.               
With.  *      13      21.7 
Without.  *      87      78.3 
Type of Observation.               
Uncompleted Duration.  *      64.5      58.6 
Completed duration.  *      35.5      41.4 
Duration. (Days).               
Current True Duration    270.74  316.27  100  192.19  196.85  100 
Entitlement Duration    354.84  339.36  100  285.77  248.40  100 
Lagged duration (days).    -  -  -  173.7  198.9  100 
Durat. until the exhaust.    84.11  164.35  100  93.57  164.95  100 
(Dur. until exhaust. /10)
2    340.85  879.83  100  359.64  841.87  100 
Entitlement Period.               
From 0 to 6 months.    3.76  1.31  55.2  3.73  1.28  59.1 
From 6 to 15 months.    11.22  2.33  14  10.96  2.29  14.9 
From 15 to 24 months.    21.56  2.16  21.8  20.15  2.19  22.4 
More than 24 months.    38.47  6.91  9.1  32.98  4.22  3.6 
Benefits (thous./month).    61.00  15.04  100  67.47  15.93  100 
Wage (thousand/month).    67.79  22.63  100  74.69  25.26  100 
Cause of Unemployment.               
End of Contract.  *      97      98.8 
Other.  *      3      1.2 
Exit of the SIPRE.               
Job.  *      35.5      41.4 
Benefits Exhausted.  *      64.5      58.6 
Job Category.               
1  *      7      7 
2  *      8.6      8.6 
3  *      4.2      4.1 
4  *      16.4      13.1 
5  *      15.2      20.9 
6  *      20.7      21.3 
7  *      27.9      25 
Economic Variables.               
Quarterly GDP rate.    3.98  1.23  100  4.11  1.29  100 
Quart. reg. Unempl. Rate.               
Low    12.73  1.14  37.5  12.57  1.17  46.1 
Intermediate.    16.45  0.91  20.2  16.42  0.90  20.7 
High.    19.23  0.82  14.7  19.25  0.83  7.4 
Very high.    26.71  3.31  27.6  26.49  2.50  25.8 
Dummy of entry.               
1
st quarter.        25.1      22.9 
2
nd quarter.        24.7      23.2 
3
rd quarter.        11.2      17.1 
4
th quarter.        39      36.9 
Dummy of exit.               
1
st quarter.        29.5      30.9 
2
nd quarter.        24.9      24.7 
3
rd quarter.        24.3      23.1 
4
th quarter.        21.3      21.3 
Sample size.    175,103  69,782 
Legend for category. 1.High levels and associate professional technicians, foremen and supervisors; 
2.Technical assistants and skilled clerical workers; 3. Semi skilled clerical workers;4. Unskilled clerical  
workers ; 5. Skilled production workers; 6. Semi skilled production workers ; 7. Unskilled production workers.   34 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics variables of unemployed with one or two 
unemployment spells under benefits and a completed past unemployment spell. 
The completed past unemployment sample. 
 
  First spell.  Second spell. 
Covariates.  Dummy.  Mean.  Std.  %.   Mean.  Std.  %.  
Gender.               
Male.        56      65.5 
Female.        44      34.5 
Age (years).               
Entry age.    25.13  4.14  100  27.07  4.39  100 
Exit age.    25.97  4.43  100  27.59  4.46  100 
Exit age square.    694.13  238.32  100  781.49  255.21  100 
Family Burdens.               
With.  *      14.4      24.8 
Without.  *      85.6      75.2 
Type of Observation.               
Uncompleted Duration.  *      52.6      44.1 
Completed duration.  *      47.4      55.9 
Duration. (Days).               
Current True Duration    302.98  340.24  100  189.25  196.76  100 
Entitlement Duration    415.40  354.35  100  321.56  256.74  100 
Lagged duration (days).          171.9  192.9  100 
Durat. until exhaust.    112.42  181.44  100  132.31  185.03  100 
(Dur. until exhaus./10)
2    455.59  991.18  100  517.36  982.52  100 
Entitlement Period.               
From 0 to 6 months.    3.96  1.39  45.3  3.97  1.40  50.6 
From 6 to 15 months.    11.27  2.34  16.3  11.12  2.34  20.9 
From 15 to 24 months.    21.54  2.15  27  20.07  2.11  23.5 
More than 24 months.    38.51  6.96  11.4  33.26  4.48  5 
Benefits (thous./month).    62.53  15.57  100  69.97  17.04  100 
Wage (thousand/month).    69.62  23.87  100  78.79  26.68  100 
Cause of Unemployment.               
End of Contract.  *      96.4      98.7 
Other.  *      3.6      1.3 
Exit of the SIPRE.               
Job.  *      47.4      55.9 
Benefits Exhausted.  *      52.6      44.1 
Job Category.               
1  *      7.4      7.3 
2  *      9.2      8.6 
3  *      4.2      4 
4  *      17.1      12.1 
5  *      14.6      22.4 
6  *      20.1      21.3 
7  *      27.4      24.4 
Economic Variables.               
Quarterly GDP rate.    3.89  1.25  100  4.03  1.28  100 
Quart. reg. Unempl. Rate.               
Low    12.65  1.15  41.3  12.52  1.17  46.2 
Intermediate.    16.40  0.90  20.2  16.36  0.89  20.7 
High.    19.23  0.83  12.6  19.26  0.83  7.7 
Very high.    26.38  3.15  25.9  26.38  2.51  25.4 
Dummy of entry.               
1
st quarter.  *      26.8      25 
2
nd quarter.  *      26.5      23.8 
3
rd quarter.  *      9.0      18.3 
4
th quarter.  *      37.7      32.8 
Dummy of exit.               
1
st quarter.  *      26.6      27.2 
2
nd quarter.  *      26      25.2 
3
rd quarter.  *      25.4      24.1 
4
th quarter.  *      22      23.4 
Sample size.    131,002  25,681 
Legend for category see table 2.   35 
 
Table 4. Gross hazard rates by variables. The entire sample. 
  1
st Spell.  2
nd Spell. 
  Gross 
hazard. 
E.S.  %   Gross 
hazard 
E.S.  %  
Covariates             
Whatever individual.  3.93  0.015  100  6.46  0.037  100.00 
Sex.             
Male.  4.62  0.022  117.66  8.34  0.057  129.21 
Female.  3.02  0.021  76.85  4.41  0.044  68.32 
Age.             
18-22 years.  5.54  0.005  141.26  7.54  0.159  116.74 
22-26 years.  5.24  0.002  133.52  7.09  0.071  109.89 
26-30 years.  3.60  0.002  91.66  6.39  0.066  99.06 
30-35 years.  2.84  0.002  72.46  5.97  0.073  92.54 
>35 years.  0.70  0.004  17.80  5.15  0.108  79.80 
Family burdens             
With.  3.33  0.031  84.89  5.48  0.060  84.86 
Without  4.08  0.018  103.96  6.93  0.046  107.29 
Job category.             
1  7.31  0.097  186.13  9.45  0.191  146.37 
2  3.19  0.042  81.11  5.99  0.121  92.92 
3  5.41  0.099  137.84  7.78  0.209  120.60 
4  3.57  0.036  90.88  5.66  0.092  87.77 
5  4.38  0.042  111.62  6.99  0.085  108.32 
6  3.49  0.031  88.92  6.18  0.077  95.78 
7  3.81  0.029  96.95  6.06  0.069  93.87 
Quarterly Unemp. Reg. Rate.             
Low.  3.32  0.021  84.51  6.20  0.052  96.05 
Intermediate.  4.03  0.034  102.63  6.64  0.084  102.99 
High  5.53  0.056  140.76  9.61  0.186  148.97 
Very high.  4.25  0.033  108.26  6.11  0.069  94.59 
Quarterly GDP rate.             
>1 and <3  3.69  0.027  94.14  4.42  0.051  68.44 
>=3 and <5  3.70  0.020  94.21  6.82  0.053  105.69 
>5  5.15  0.044  131.16  11.22  0.138  173.84 
Cause of unemployment.             
End of the contract.  4.01  0.016  102.19  6.48  0.037  100.41 
Others.  2.59  0.051  65.99  5.02  0.241  77.80 
Level of benefits.             
<= 60 thousand ptas month.  2.98  0.015  75.81  4.75  0.037  73.59 
60-80 thousand ptas. month.  8.31  0.067  211.68  9.45  0.103  146.45 
80-100 thousand ptas month.  12.36  0.144  314.57  12.41  0.172  192.29 
>100 thousand ptas. month.  18.71  0.482  476.16  18.88  0.474  292.48 
Net Wage.             
<= 60 thousand ptas/month.  3.05  0.021  77.69  4.45  0.052  68.97 
60-75 thousand ptas/ month.  3.84  0.025  97.85  6.22  0.063  96.32 
75-100 thousand month.  5.27  0.045  134.07  8.21  0.086  127.19 
100-125 thousand month.  6.61  0.101  168.33  10.37  0.190  160.58 
125-150 thousand month.  7.97  0.194  202.93  11.04  0.328  171.01 
>150 thousand month.  8.77  0.252  223.18  11.93  0.418  184.82 
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Continuation table 4. 
  1
st Spell.  2
nd Spell. 
  Gross 
hazard 
E.S.  %   Gross 
hazard 
E.S.  %  
Dummies of entry.             
1
st quarter.  3.89  0.030  99.01  7.20  0.080  111.60 
2
nd quarter.  3.74  0.030  95.15  5.64  0.067  87.39 
3
rd quarter.  4.01  0.047  102.08  7.00  0.093  108.44 
4
th quarter.  4.07  0.026  103.61  6.29  0.063  97.57 
Dummies of exit.             
1
st quarter.  4.91  0.036  124.99  7.17  0.079  111.17 
2
nd quarter.  4.14  0.031  105.36  6.32  0.068  97.91 
3
rd quarter.  3.44  0.029  87.49  5.89  0.071  91.25 
4
th quarter.  3.36  0.028  85.69  6.48  0.076  100.39 
Lagged unempl. Duration.             
<=3 months  -  -  -  6.70  0.049  103.86 
>3 and <=6 months  -  -  -  7.30  0.095  113.08 
>6 and <=12 months  -  -  -  6.92  0.117  107.24 
>12 and <=18 months  -  -  -  6.11  0.161  94.69 
>18 and <=24 months  -  -  -  4.26  0.117  65.95 
>24 months  -  -  -  2.37  0.112  36.74 
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Table 5.Gross hazard rates by variables. The completed past unemployment sample. 
  1
st Spell.  2
nd Spell. 
  Gross 
hazard. 
E.S.  %   Gross 
hazard 
E.S.  %  
Covariates             
Whatever individual.  4.69  0.018  100  8.86  0.071  100 
Sex.               
Male.    7.51  0.036  160.18  10.52  0.099  118.74 
Female.    2.67  0.018  57.01  6.48  0.095  73.18 
Age.             
18-22 years.  7.47  0.069  159.22  10.11  0.314  114.00 
22-26 years.  6.53  0.042  139.10  9.73  0.140  109.79 
26-30 years.  4.21  0.032  89.64  8.77  0.126  98.91 
30-35 years.  3.23  0.029  68.96  8.42  0.137  94.93 
>35 years.  0.76  0.031  16.29  7.24  0.201  81.69 
Family burdens             
With.  3.79  0.036  80.98  8.51  0.126  96.09 
Without  4.94  0.021  105.29  9.02  0.085  101.71 
Job category.             
1  8.65  0.114  184.44  12.53  0.351  141.41 
2  3.63  0.048  77.31  8.23  0.227  92.86 
3  6.46  0.117  137.66  9.72  0.381  109.68 
4  4.16  0.041  88.68  7.55  0.179  85.21 
5  5.38  0.052  114.85  9.48  0.156  107.02 
6  4.21  0.037  89.72  8.67  0.150  97.82 
7  4.61  0.035  98.36  8.48  0.139  95.73 
Quarterly Unemp. Reg. Rate.             
Low.  3.72  0.024  79.3  8.46  0.100  95.4 
Intermediate.  4.91  0.042  104.5  9.01  0.160  101.7 
High  7.68  0.077  163.8  12.67  0.340  142.9 
Very high.  5.30  0.040  113.1  8.64  0.136  97.5 
Quarterly GDP rate.             
>1 and <3  4.09  0.030  87.3  6.18  0.099  69.7 
>=3 and <5  4.46  0.025  95.0  9.15  0.098  103.2 
>5  7.02  0.060  149.6  16.88  0.289  190.5 
Cause of unemployment.             
End of the contract.  4.81  0.019  102.51  8.87  0.071  100.06 
Others.  2.95  0.058  62.98  8.52  0.547  96.09 
Level of benefits.             
<= 60 thousand ptas month.  3.54  0.017  75.42  6.34  0.073  71.56 
60-80 thousand ptas. month.  10.45  0.083  222.88  12.76  0.189  143.98 
80-100 thousand ptas month.  14.54  0.168  309.81  15.93  0.290  179.72 
>100 thousand ptas. month.  19.33  0.496  412.06  22.49  0.707  253.71 
Net Wage.             
<= 60 thousand ptas/month.  3.79  0.026  80.97  6.86  0.123  77.45 
60-75 thousand ptas/ month.  4.56  0.030  97.34  7.99  0.115  90.14 
75-100 thousand month.  5.92  0.051  126.21  10.20  0.145  115.06 
100-125 thousand month.  7.30  0.111  155.62  12.16  0.291  137.12 
125-150 thousand month.  8.59  0.208  183.06  13.16  0.509  148.42 
>150 thousand month.  9.34  0.268  199.02  13.55  0.600  152.82 
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Continuation table 5. 
  1
st Spell.  2
nd Spell. 
  Gross 
hazard 
E.S.  %   Gross 
hazard 
E.S.  %  
Dummies of entry.             
1
st quarter.  4.52  0.034  96.3  8.96  0.140  101.1 
2
nd quarter.  4.32  0.034  92.0  8.45  0.139  95.3 
3
rd quarter.  5.39  0.063  115.1  9.18  0.169  103.6 
4
th quarter.  4.91  0.031  104.7  8.93  0.126  100.7 
Dummies of exit.               
1
st quarter.  6.14  0.045  130.9  10.04  0.155  113.3 
2
nd quarter.  4.89  0.037  104.3  9.15  0.140  103.3 
3
rd quarter.  4.13  0.035  88.0  8.31  0.137  93.8 
4
th quarter.  3.89  0.032  82.9  8.05  0.133  90.8 
Lagged unempl. Duration.             
<=3 months  -  -  -  9.74  0.109  109.83 
>3 and <=6 months  -  -  -  8.82  0.147  99.47 
>6 and <=12 months  -  -  -  8.29  0.172  93.55 
>12 and <=18 months  -  -  -  7.44  0.225  83.96 
>18 and <=24 months  -  -  -  6.74  0.287  76.02 
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Table 6. Parameters estimates and their standard errors. 
  Entire sample.  Sample with completed past unempl. 
  1
st spell.  2
nd spell.  1
st spell.  2
nd Spell. 
  Param.  S. E.  Param.  S. E.  Param.  S.E.  Param.  S. E. 
Intercept.  -137.743  5.2250  -301.61  15.3558  -161.88  5.3030  -330.361  20.9685 
Duration (days).  10.0471  0.5969  36.7174  1.2589  11.4402  0.6172  31.6258  1.5881 
Duration square (days).  -300.986  11.5169  -683.13  32.8902  -353.29  11.7098  -731.805  44.7410 
Sex (female)  -0.6611  0.0096  -0.5714  0.0151  -0.6549  0.0102  -0.4210  0.0206 
(Age time varying /10) in years.  -1.0700  0.1186  -2.1680  0.1786  -1.3022  0.1274  -2.2192  0.2560 
(Age time varying /100)
2 in years.  0.1129  0.0221  0.3215  0.0311  0.1538  0.0238  0.3148  0.0443 
Job category.                 
1  0.3108  0.0187  0.1550  0.0308  0.3077  0.0202  0.1885  0.0405 
2  -0.1841  0.0177  -0.1290  0.0282  -0.1959  0.0189  -0.1177  0.0366 
3  0.0941  0.0222  0.0743  0.0355  0.0662  0.0239  -0.0138  0.0484 
4  -0.0262  0.0156  -0.0453  0.0249  -0.0644  0.0167  -0.1111  0.0336 
5(&)  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
6  -0.1164  0.0143  -0.0901  0.0208  -0.1266  0.0154  -0.1065  0.0268 
7  -0.1355  0.0136  -0.0925  0.0198  -0.1756  0.0147  -0.0703  0.0261 
Family burdens (with)  0.0494  0.0119  -0.2627  0.0163  0.0414  0.0128  -0.1156  0.0211 
Benefits t.v. (thous. ptas. month).  0.0433  0.0004  0.0323  0.0006  0.0424  0.0004  0.0322  0.0008 
Net wages(thous. ptas. month).  -0.0141  0.0003  -0.0051  0.0004  -0.0151  0.0003  -0.0090  0.0006 
End of the contract.  0.1741  0.0218  0.2073  0.0581  0.1403  0.0231  0.0978  0.0763 
Dur. until exhaust. t.v. (days/10) 
 
0.0713  0.0008  0.0760  0.0013  0.0552  0.0008  0.0624  0.0018 
(Dur. until exh. t.v.)
2 (days /1000)  -0.0108  0.0001  -0.0106  0.0002  -0.0092  0.0001  -0.0091  0.0003 
Lagged duration (months).  -  -  -0.0171  0.0011  -  -  0.0002  0.0015 
Quart. reg. unempl. rate t.v.  0.0073  0.0008  -0.0008  0.0012  0.0146  0.0008  0.0049  0.0018 
Quart. GDP rate t.v.  -0.0278  0.0036  0.0950  0.0066  -0.0040  0.0038  0.1057  0.0092 
Dummies exit.                 
1
st quarter.  0.2803  0.0125  0.1978  0.0194  0.3405  0.0132  0.1372  0.0250 
2
nd quarter.  0.1654  0.0125  0.1076  0.0190  0.1563  0.0133  0.0615  0.0250 
3
rd quarter. (&)  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
4
th quarter.  0.0126  0.0126  0.0510  0.0194  0.0406  0.0135  -0.0508  0.0259 
Dummies of entry.                 
1
st quarter.  -0.1217  0.0153  -0.0065  0.0201  -0.2324  0.0162  -0.0408  0.0268 
2
nd quarter.  -0.1357  0.0151  -0.1542  0.0205  -0.2533  0.0161  -0.0636  0.0270 
3
rd quarter.(&)  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
4
th  quarter.  -0.1208  0.0145  -0.1235  0.0196  -0.2232  0.0155  -0.0495  0.0261 
Factor loading.  0.5212  0.0272  1.2624  0.0398  0.9785  0.0163  1.0747  0.0455 
Sample (censored %).  175,103(64.5)  69,782(58.6)  131,002(52.6)  25,681(44.1) 
Log likelihood.  -192617.6998  -175439.8145 
Legend. Job category in table 2. & indicates the characterictics of the reference individual.; t.v. means time varying 
covariate.   40 
 
 
Table 7.  Support points that approximate the probability distribution of the unobserved 
heterogeneity component corresponding to estimation of table 6. 
 
 
  Entire sample  Completed past unemployment sample. 
Support points.  Localiz.  Cum. prob.  Sign.  Localiz.  Cum. prob.  Sign. 
First point.  0.00  0.54  ***  0.00  0.70  *** 
Second point.  0.80  0.80  ***  0.8  0.80  *** 
Third point.  1.00  1.00  ***  1.00  1.00  *** 
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Figure 1. Empirical hazard of workers who experience one or two unemployment spells under 




Figure 2. Empirical hazard of workers who experience one or two unemployment spell under 
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